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Abstract
We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979)
to a continuous time model in which two rms compete in each instance. Our
focus is on the entry timing decisions of rms and their optimal locations. We
demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer to the centre to delay
the follower's entry, leading to a non-maximum dierentiation outcome. We also
investigate how exogenous parameters aect the leader's location and rms' values
and, in particular, numerically show that the prot of the leader changes non-
monotonically with an increase in the transport cost parameter.
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1 Introduction
Researchers in economics and marketing have emphasised the importance of (horizontal)
product dierentiation in the context of rm competition (e.g. d'Aspremont et al., 1979;
Brown, 1989; Lancaster, 1990). When rms launch their new products into markets,
timing and product characteristics are some of the important factors for their prots (e.g.
Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). Taking into account rms' decisions regarding product dif-
ferentiation, researchers theoretically and/or empirically investigate how rms determine
the timing of launching their products and those characteristics (e.g. Lambertini, 1997;
Thomadsen, 2007).
From the theoretical point of view, Lambertini (2002) presented pioneering work that
discusses the strategic interaction between the optimal locations of the inventor (the
market leader), who anticipates subsequent entry and the location choice of the follower
in a Hotelling-type spatial competition model, as in d'Aspremont et al. (1979).1 He
was the rst to introduce a dynamic model in the sense that time is continuous, the
rm locations are xed once entry is made and that rms earn their prots in each
instance. Regarding the time structure, several papers deal with sequential locational
entry in a discrete time model, which allows qualitative analyses such as how many steps
the timing of investment would change given a change in other parameters (e.g. Prescott
and Visscher, 1977). However, a more rigorous quantitative analysis, such as determining
the percentage change in the investment time attributable to a percentage change in a
parameter, requires a continuous time model.2
1Location point is interpreted as a rm's dierentiation selection because the distance between a rm's
location point and a consumer's address corresponds to that between a rm's attribute and a consumer's
ideal point. This interpretation is standard in spatial economics and marketing literature.
2Continuous time models are often used in models such as real option game models that investigate
the timing problem of rms' entry without the locational context (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Chapter
9; Azevedo and Paxson, 2014). These studies introduce one or more probabilistic uctuations into their
models. Our model is deterministic and does not focus on this randomness but instead, focuses on the
relation between location and entry timing. The real option game approach is useful for taking into
account the endogenous timing decision.
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This novel point is from Lambertini (2002) and diers signicantly from those in
related theoretical papers discussing sequential location choices based on Hotelling-type
spatial competition models (e.g. Neven, 1987; Gotz, 2005).3 Those related papers are
static Hotelling models in the sense that each rm has only one prot earning chance.4
Lambertini (2002) considered two scenarios: (i) the follower's timing of entry is exogenous
and (ii) the follower's timing of entry is probabilistically determined. Therefore, the
follower does not endogenously determine its optimal timing of entry in either scenario.
To summarise, Lambertini (2002) considered a continuous time model, but an endogenous
entry timing model with continuous time has not been considered in locational models.
Because the entry timing of followers signicantly inuences market leaders as well as
followers (Kalyanaram et al., 1995; Vakratsas et al., 2003), we need to overcome the
weakness in the model given by Lambertini (2002) and endogenise the follower's entry-
timing decision. Therefore, our paper substantially extends the model of Lambertini
(2002).
We incorporate several aspects into the standard Hotelling duopoly model in d'Aspremont
et al. (1979). The time horizon is innite, as in Lambertini (2002). Each rm sets a price
and earns a prot in each instance if it exists in the market, implying that a delay of
entry causes a loss of prot opportunity. In anticipation of subsequent entry by the fol-
lower, the market leader initially sets its location. Because the leader's location decision
inuences the prots of the follower, it also aects the timing of the entry (the length
of the monopoly period), thus representing an additional value of our paper. After the
location choice of the market leader, the follower determines the timing of entry and its
location. When the follower enters the market, it incurs an investment cost that expo-
nentially decreases with the standard discount rate. In contrast, consumer size increases
with a growth rate lower than the discount rate. By balancing the benet and cost of
3Many papers discussed sequential location choices in spatial competition models. Kress and Pesch
(2012) and Biscaia and Mota (2013) provided comprehensive surveys on spatial competition.
4Lambertini (1997) and Meza and Tombak (2009) considered the endogenous timing of locations in
such static Hotelling models.
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staying outside, the follower determines its entry timing and location.
Compared with Lambertini (2002), our contributions in this paper are threefold. The
rst contribution is that we endogenise the follower's timing. The second contribution
follows the rst, as we introduce investment costs and a growth rate in consumer size to
make the model more realistic. In addition, the growth rate ensures that the entry occurs
within a nite time5 and, in turn, aects the leader's location. The third contribution
is a strategic interaction between the leader's location and the follower's entry timing.
In addition to the eects considered by Lambertini (2002), the leader's moving closer to
the centre increases the follower's incentive to delay its entry, prolonging the monopoly
regime. Thus, by endogenising the follower's timing, the leader has a stronger incentive
to move closer to the central point. Although this strategic interaction among the leader's
location, the follower's location and its entry timing is an important aspect of this problem,
Lambertini (2002) does not take into account this strategic interaction because of his
assumption of an exogenous entry timing by the follower.
We also show that the follower always chooses to maximise the distance between the
rms whereas the leader has an incentive to locate closer to the centre to delay the fol-
lower's entry, possibly leading to a non-maximum dierentiation outcome. Furthermore,
the location interval between the leader and the follower is negatively correlated with the
length of time for which the follower stays outside. These results are similar to those in
Lambertini (2002), although the mechanism behind these results denitely diers between
the two papers.
Finally, we show that the entry timing becomes earlier as the growth rate of consumer
size or the parameter of consumer transport cost increases, and becomes later as the
discount rate increases. We numerically investigate how those exogenous parameters
inuence their prots. A notable result is that the prot of the market leader non-
5This phenomenon implies that just introducing a timing endogeneity into Lambertini (2002) without
a growth rate yields no entry and a perpetual monopoly by the leader.
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monotonically changes with an increase in the consumer transport cost parameter.6
2 The Model
Two rms, i 2 f1; 2g, produce homogeneous goods. Consumers are uniformly distributed
over the unit segment [0; 1] as proposed by Hotelling (1929).7 Each consumer at point x 2
[0; 1] purchases at most one unit of the good and decides from which rm to purchase if he
does make a purchase. The consumer at point x 2 [0; 1] incurs a quadratic transportation
cost c(xi   x)2 and pays price pit at time t 2 [0;1) when buying a good from rm i
located at xi 2 [0; 1]. To summarise, the utility of the consumer at point x 2 [0; 1] at
time t 2 [0;1) is given by
ut(x; x1; x2; p1t; p2t) =
8><>:
u  p1t   c(x1   x)2 if purchased from rm 1;
u  p2t   c(x2   x)2 if purchased from rm 2;
0 otherwise;
(1)
where u denotes the gross surplus that a consumer at point x enjoys from purchasing
the good, and c is a parameter describing the level of transportation cost or product
dierentiation. Let us assume that u is so large that each consumer prefers to purchase
one good over not buying when at least one rm is present in the market.8
Assumption 1 u > 3c.
The game proceeds as follows: Each rm i chooses the time of entry Ti 2 [0;1) and
location xi 2 [0; 1] at the same time, and then chooses price pit : <+ ! <+ at each time
t, which is a function from time t 2 [0;1) to a real number [0;1) and is displayed as pit
for simplicity. In addition, we assume that rm 1 is the leader who just entered at T1 = 0,
6The transport cost parameter can be interpreted as a parameter that describes the level of product
dierentiation because the cost parameter corresponds to a consumer's disutility between the consumer's
ideal point and the degree of a product's attribute. This interpretation is standard in the literature on
spatial economics and marketing.
7This setting and the following assumptions are standard in the literature on spatial economics.
8In other words, rm 1, located at x1 = 0, has an incentive to supply a positive amount at location 1,
after maximizing its prot.
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whereas rm 2 is the follower who enters at time T2, to be subsequently and endogenously
determined. In this way, rm 1 decides x1 at time T1 = 0 once and subsequently chooses
price p1t at each time t. After observing rm 1's actions before rm 2's entry, rm 2
chooses to enter at time T2 and location x2 and thereafter chooses p2t at each time t.
Firm i can choose its location only when it makes its entry in the project, at which time
it incurs an entry cost Fi(Ti). We also assume (without loss of generality) that x1  1=2
holds in equilibrium.
Now, let us describe the present value of the rms at time 0 given that rm 2 would
enter at point x2 at time t = T2. Note that rm 1 enters at point x1 at time t = T1 = 0.
The timing is exogenous9 but x1 is to be determined endogenously in the following analysis.
The total prot of rm 1, the leader, is given by
V1(T2; x1; x2; p1t; p2t) =
Z T2
0
Z 1
0
p1t(x;x1)e
 (r )tdxdt
+
Z 1
T2
Z x
0
p1t(x;x1; x2; p2t)e
 (r )tdxdt  F1(0); (2)
where r denotes the interest rate,  denotes the growth rate parameter of the market and
x denotes a point at which the consumer is indierent between purchasing from rm 1 or
2. From (1), x = [p2t p1t+c(x22 x21)]=[2c(x2 x1)]. We assume that r >  to ensure that
the follower enters in a nite time. Firm 1 earns monopoly prot ow at t 2 [;  + d)
until rm 2 enters the market, and rm 1 earns duopoly prot ow after rm 2's entry.
The total prot of rm 2, the follower, is given by
V2(T2; x1; x2; p1t; p2t) =
Z 1
T2
Z 1
x
p2t(x; x1; x2; p1t)e
 (r )tdxdt  F2(T2): (3)
After entry, rm 2 earns duopoly prot ow at t 2 [;  + d) to which it supplies.
Let us now make the following assumptions for the entry cost function Fi.
9A similar interpretation is made in Chronopoulos et al. (2014) as a non-preemptive duopoly. In their
paper, the roles of the leader and the follower are dened exogenously. Consequently, the future cash
ows of the leader are discounted to time t = 0.
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Assumption 2 (i) Fi(Ti) = Fie
 rTi,
(ii) F1(0) = F1 <
R1
0
R x
0
p1t(x; x1; x2; p2t)e
 (r )tdxdt for all x2 2 [x1; 1],
(iii) F2(0) = F2 >
R1
0
R 1
x
p2t(x;x1; x2; p1t)e
 rtdxdt for all x1 2 [0; x2].
Assumption 2 (ii) suggests that F1 is small enough that the leader can earn non-negative
total prot at time 0 whenever the follower enters and wherever the follower locates.
Similarly, Assumption 2 (iii) suggests that F2 is suciently large enough to enable the
follower to enter sequentially at T2 > 0 in an equilibrium, because we would like to
avoid simultaneous entry at time 0 and focus on sequential entry.10 This assumption also
implies that the leader, but not the follower, has already learned how to enter the market
eciently.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the price, location and timing outcomes in the subgame perfect
equilibrium. First, given locations x1 and x2, we consider the problem of prices at each
time t before and after the entry of rm 2. Then, we derive the local prots of the leader
and the follower at each time t.
The following are the equilibrium prices. Notably, the maximisation of the instanta-
neous prot ows is equivalent to the maximisation of the total prots. In other words,
rm 1 maximises the following equation with respect to p1t before rm 2 enters t 2 [0; T2)
when T2 is exogenously given:
max
p1t
Z 1
0
p1t(x; x1)dx: (4)
After rm 2 enters t 2 [T2;1) when T2 is exogenously given, rm 1 maximises the
following with respect to p1t:
max
p1t
Z x
0
p1t(x; x1; x2; p2t)dx; (5)
10If simultaneous entry occurs, this model reverts to the standard location{price model of d'Aspremont
et al. (1979).
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and rm 2 maximises the following with respect to p2t:
max
p2t
Z 1
x
p2t(x;x1; x2; p1t)dx: (6)
Solving these maximisation problems results in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The prices set by the leader and the follower are
~p1t =
(
pM1 = u  c(1  x1)2 t 2 [0; T2)
pD1 =
c
3
(x2   x1)(2 + x1 + x2) t 2 [T2;1);
(7)
~p2t = p
D
2 =
c
3
(x2   x1)(4  x1   x2) t 2 [T2;1): (8)
Proof. See Appendix 
For t 2 [0; T2), the monopoly leader maximises its price under the constraint that all
consumers purchase its good. Assuming that x1  1=2 without loss of generality, the
furthest consumer is located at 1. The consumer turns out to be indierent between
purchasing the good at price pM1 and not purchasing the good. p
D
i (i = 1; 2) is derived
using the standard calculation in the context of spatial competition (e.g. d'Aspremont et
al., 1979).
The instantaneous prot ows of the two rms are
1t(x1; x2) =
(
M1 (x1) =
R 1
0
pM1 dx = u  c(1  x1)2 t 2 [0; T2)
D1 (x1; x2) =
R x
0
pD1 dx = p
D
1 x =
c
18
(x2   x1)(2 + x1 + x2)2 t 2 [T2;1);
(9)
2t(x1; x2) =
(
0 t 2 [0; T2)
D2 (x1; x2) =
R 1
x
pD2 dx = p
D
2 (1  x) = c18(x2   x1)(4  x1   x2)2 t 2 [T2;1):
(10)
Note that x = (2 + x1 + x2)=6. Substituting the outcomes of equations (7) to (10) into
equations (2) and (3), the total prots of the leader and the follower are derived as
V1(T2; x1; x2; p1t; p2t) =
Z T2
0
M1 (x1)e
 (r )tdt+
Z 1
T2
D1 (x1; x2)e
 (r )tdt  F1; (11)
V2(T2; x1; x2; p1t; p2t) =
Z 1
T2
D2 (x1; x2)e
 (r )tdt  F2(T2): (12)
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3.1 Follower
We consider the problem of the follower regarding when it enters and where it locates in
the market. With regards to the location, we have the following:
Lemma 2 The follower always locates at x2 = 1.
Proof. From equation (12), x2 only depends on 
D
2 . From equation (10), we have
@D2 (x1; x2)
@x2
=
c
18
(4 + x1   3x2)(4  x1   x2); (13)
which is positive for x1 and x2 2 [0; 1]. Thus, the optimal location for rm 2 is at 1,
regardless of the other parameters. 
From Lemma 2, we show that the follower always locates as far away from the location
of the leader as possible when entering the market. This result replicates that of Lam-
bertini (2002) and seems to be robust to the endogeneity of the follower's entry timing.
Substituting the equilibrium prots and the location of the follower into the total prot
functions V1 and V2, we have
V1(T2; x1; 1; ~p1t; ~p2t) =
1  e (r )T2
r    [u  c(1  x1)
2] +
e (r )T2
r   
c
18
(1  x1)(3 + x1)2   F1;
(14)
V2(T2; x1; 1; ~p1t; ~p2t) =
e (r )T2
r   
c
18
(1  x1)(3  x1)2   F2e rT2 : (15)
We note that if F1  F2, the leader's value is always greater than the follower's value in
our setting. That is, since D1  D2 , we have
V1   V2  
M
1
r   
 
1  e (r )T2  F1(1  e rT2) >  M1
r      F1
 
1  e (r )T2 > 0:
(16)
We use Assumption 2 (ii) from the end of the last section to ensure F1 < 
M
1 =(r ), the
present value of prots when the leader sustains monopoly prot forever.
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Thus, the rest of the follower's decision problem is only its endogenously determined
entry timing, which is not present in Lambertini (2002). We have the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1 The entry timing of the follower is
~T2(x1) =
1

log

rF2
D2 (x1; 1)

=
1

log

18rF2
c(1  x1)(3  x1)2

: (17)
Proof. Dierentiating V2(T2; x1; 1; ~p1t; ~p2t) with respect to T2 yields
@V2(T2; x1; 1; ~p1t; ~p2t)
@T2
=  e (r )T2D2 (x1; 1) + rF2e rT2 = 0: (18)
Solving this equation with respect to T2 gives ~T2(x1) as a solution. Note that ~T2 is positive
from Assumption 2 (iii). Examining the second-order derivative yields the following
@2V2
@T 22
= (r   )e (r )T2D2 (x1; 1)  r2F2e rT2 : (19)
Substituting ~T2(x1) into the second-order derivative shows that @
2V2=@T
2
2 jT2= ~T2(x1) is nega-
tive. Because the rst-order condition is uniquely satised and the second-order derivative
is negative at this point, the unique, positive and interior solution exists. Thus, we have
the desired result. 
The following corollaries show the change in the follower's entry timing as the leader's
location x1 and the exogenous parameters change.
Corollary 1 If x1 is increased, the optimal timing for the follower to enter is delayed.
x1 aects the entry timing of the follower as follows. Only the denominator within the
fraction inside the log in equation (17) is composed of the locations chosen by the rms.
Thus, we focus on this part of the equation, namely, D2 (x1; 1). When rm 1 locates away
from rm 2 (or x1 is decreased), rm 2 can deliver the product in a broader region (x
decreases), and rm 2 can earn a higher prot (D2 increases). Therefore, rm 2 enters
earlier (later) if rm 1 locates away from (closer to) rm 2.
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Corollary 2 If F2 or r is increased, or as c or  is decreased, the optimal timing for the
follower to enter is delayed.
As is seen in the next subsection, x1 depends on the previous parameters. Therefore, a
change in these parameters aects the entry timing of the follower through a direct eect
(Corollary 2) and an indirect eect (Corollary 1).
3.2 Leader
Finally, we consider the problem of the leader. Substituting the outcomes of the follower,
Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 into the total prot function of the leader, the maximisation
problem of the leader is given by
max
x12[0;1=2]
V1( ~T2(x1); x1; 1; ~p1t; ~p2t)
=
1  e (r ) ~T2(x1)
r    [u  c(1  x1)
2] +
e (r ) ~T2(x1)
r   
c
18
(1  x1)(2 + x1 + 1)2   F1:
(20)
Because the derivation of the equilibrium is complicated, we investigate the impact on the
value of the leader when the location of the leader changes innitesimally, before deriving
the equilibrium outcome presented in Proposition 2. Dierentiating V1( ~T2(x1); x1; 1; ~p1t; ~p2t)
with respect to x1 yields
@V1( ~T2(x1); x1; 1; ~p1t; ~p2t)
@x1
= e (r )
~T2(x1)
d ~T2(x1)
dx1
(M1 (x1)  D1 (x1; 1))
+
1  exp( (r   ) ~T2(x1))
r   
dM1 (x1)
dx1
+
exp( (r   ) ~T2(x1))
r   
dD1 (x1; 1)
dx1
: (21)
The sign of equation (21) is the key and determines the location of the leader: whether
it is located at the centre (1=2), edge (0), or an interior point (strictly between 0 and 1=2).
The rst term of (21) represents the gain from the delay of entry by rm 2 that is caused
by an increase in x1, allowing rm 1 to maintain its monopoly prot before the duopoly
11
regime begins. This term is not present in Lambertini (2002) and captures the essence
behind our results. Therefore, if this term turns out to be large, our result may become
signicantly dierent from that of Lambertini (2002). The second term of (21) signies
the increase in the monopoly prot attributable to moving closer to the centre. The third
term of (21) shows how the duopoly prot decreases as rm 1 moves closer to rm 2, thus
intensifying competition.11 The rst two terms are positive and the last term is negative.
Thus, if the eect of the last term is relatively small, the optimal location of rm 1 is 1=2.
We now investigate the eect of each parameter on the equilibrium location of rm 1,
which we denote as xE1 . First, consider the eects of parameters  and r on x
E
1 . As 
approaches r, the weight on the periods after which rm 2 enters the market gets larger.
Therefore, rm 1 needs to take into account protability under the duopoly situation.
The signicance of the last term dominates that of the other two terms, which implies
that the optimal location of rm 1 is x1 = 0. In contrast, if  becomes smaller, the
converse holds. Thus, the eect of parameter r is essentially the opposite of that of .
Parameter u appears only in the rst term, which is increasing in u. As the location
of rm 1 becomes closer to the centre, the leader obtains the monopoly prot for a longer
time because the follower's timing of entry is delayed from Corollary 1. An increase in u
yields a stronger incentive to obtain this prot. Thus, as u increases, the leader is more
likely to locate at xE1 = 1=2.
Regarding F2 and c, they aect equation (21) through ~T2 in that an increase in F2 or
a decrease in c increases ~T2. Thus, the eects of these two parameters counter each other.
Note that the term d ~T2(x1)=dx1 is independent of c or F2. From Corollary 2, increasing
F2 delays the entry of the follower (increasing ~T2), and F2 does not aect equation (21) in
other ways. The discounted present value of the increase in prot from a longer monopoly
regime attributable to rm 1 locating closer to the centre is decreased. Thus, the rst
term is decreasing in F2. The second term is increasing in F2 because the increase in the
11Although T2 is not endogenised, the second and third terms describe how Lambertini (2002) deter-
mined the leader's location.
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monopoly prot for rm 1 from its moving closer to the centre is sustained longer due to
the entry delay. Similarly, the third term is also increasing in F2, as the decrease in the
duopoly prot for rm 1 from its moving closer to the centre is devalued from the entry
delay. These three eects are complicated, and none of them are analytically dominant.
We numerically examine this issue in the next section.
The eect of parameter c counters that of F2 with respect to how they aect ~T2. In
addition, c enters in all the prot levels. Namely, c has two contrasting eects on the prot
of rm 1. First, the monopoly prot of rm 1 is decreasing in c. When the rm supplies
to all consumers, it needs to compensate consumers for transport costs by lowering its
monopoly price. The compensation is higher as the consumer transport cost parameter
increases. Second, the parameter c is positively related to the duopoly prot of rm 1
as in the standard Hotelling model with price competition. The eect of the rst term
is lower as the parameter c increases, whereas those of the second and third terms are
higher. Therefore, the relative importance of the three terms inuences the eect of c
on the location choice of rm 1. Unlike the previous argument, this eect depends on
the parameters  and r. We apply the previous argument regarding  to the eect of
parameter c on the optimal location of rm 1. If  approaches r, the signicance of the
last term dominates that of the second term, which implies that the optimal location of
rm 1 is more likely to become xE1 = 0 as c increases. In contrast, if  becomes smaller,
the signicance of the second term dominates the last, which implies that the optimal
location of rm 1 is more likely to become xE1 = 1=2 as c increases. If r is suciently
large, for example r > 1 + , the optimal location of rm 1 is more likely to become
xE1 = 0 as c increases because the rst term is relatively large.
Solving (20), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (a) If (21) is positive for any x1 2 [0; 1=2], the outcome of the subgame
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perfect equilibrium is
T 2 =
1

log

144rF2
25c

; x1 =
1
2
; x2 = 1; x
 =
7
12
; (22)
p1t =
(
~pM1 (x

1) = u  c4 t 2 [0; T 2 )
pD1 (x

1; x

2) =
7c
12
t 2 [T 2 ;1);
p2t = p
D
2 (x

1; x

2) =
5c
12
t 2 [T 2 ;1): (23)
(b) If (21) is negative for any x1 2 [0; 1=2], the outcome of the subgame perfect equilibrium
is
T 2 =
1

log

2rF2
c

; x1 = 0; x

2 = 1; x
 =
1
2
; (24)
p1t =
(
pM1 (x

1 ) = u  c t 2 [0; T 2 )
pD1 (x

1 ; x

2 ) = c t 2 [T 2 ;1);
p2t = p
D
2 (x

1 ; x

2 ) = c t 2 [T 2 ;1): (25)
(c) If the equilibrium location of rm 1, x1 , is strictly between 0 and 1/2, then the
outcome of subgame perfect equilibrium is
T 2 =
1

log

18rF2
c(1  x1 )(3  x1 )2

; x2 = 1; x
 =
3 + x1
6
; (26)
p1t =
(
pM1 (x

1 ) = u  c(1  x1 )2 t 2 [0; T 2 )
pD1 (x

1 ; x

2 ) =
c
3
(1  x1 )(3 + x1 ) t 2 [T 2 ;1);
(27)
p2t = p
D
2 (x

1 ; x

2 ) =
c
3
(1  x1 )(3  x1 ) t 2 [T 2 ;1): (28)
Proposition 2 shows that three types of equilibrium location for the leader can emerge.
Similar to Lambertini (2002), we show that rm 1 can locate at 0, 0.5 or an interior loca-
tion depending on the parameter values. However, a case exists in which the introduction
of endogenous entry timing leads to dierent equilibrium location outcomes compared
with Lambertini (2002) using the same parameter values. To grasp the intuition behind
this result, we proceed with a numerical analysis in the next section.
4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we investigate in detail the underlying properties of our model using
numerical analysis. First, we investigate the eects of the key parameters, , c and F2,
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on rm 1's equilibrium location, which we denote as xE1 2 fx1; x1 ; x1 g. Then, we show
the importance of the endogeneity of T2, namely the rst term of equation (21). Finally,
we examine the eects of the parameters on the total values of the rms in equilibrium.
4.1 The leader's location
This subsection examines the eects of parameters (; c; F2) on the equilibrium location
of the leader.
First, let us consider the eect of  on xE1 . Let us set the parameters as r = 0:1; u = 4
and c = 1. We use three tables to illustrate the relationship between  and the equilibrium
location for the leader. F2 = 20; 50 and 100 for Tables 1 to 3, respectively. The values
of  are incremented by one ten-thousandth. As explained in the previous section, we
pointed out that the location xE1 moves from 1=2 to 0 as  approaches r. We conrm this
result from all three tables.
Additionally, we investigate the eects of F2 on x
E
1 when  approaches r.  denotes
the lowest value for which the equilibrium xE1 is 0, and  denotes the highest value for
which the equilibrium xE1 is 1=2. Tables 1 to 3 imply that both  and  are increasing
in F2. This implication is consistent with the intuition oered in the previous section. In
addition, the range of the interior location,    , is increasing in F2. Therefore, as F2
increases, the equilibrium location is likely to become interior or 1=2 and not 0.
    0:0961 0:0962    0:0969    0:0976 0:0977   
xE1 0:5 0:5 0:432    0:171    0:014 0 0
Table 1: Location of rm 1, x1, when r = 0:1; u = 4; F2 = 20; and c = 1. We have
 = 0:0961;  = 0:0977:
Second, we investigate the eect of c on the equilibrium location of the leader. Figure
1 illustrates the equilibrium location of rm 1 for dierent values of c when F2 = 20 and
F2 = 13. Consider the case in which an interior solution can exist. An interior solution
exists when  approaches r. We consider the same values as in the previous numerical
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    0:0964 0:0965    0:0973    0:0981 0:0982   
xE1 0:5 0:5 0:453    0:192    0:011 0 0
Table 2: Location of rm 1, x1, when r = 0:1; u = 4; F2 = 50; and c = 1. We have
 = 0:0964;  = 0:0982:
    0:0966 0:0967    0:975    0:0983 0:0984   
xE1 0:5 0:5 0:46    0:212    0:024 0 0
Table 3: Location of rm 1, xE1 , when r = 0:1; u = 4; F2 = 100; and c = 1. We have
 = 0:0966;  = 0:0984:
analysis; r = 0:1,  = 0:096 and u = 4. As u > 3c, c 2 (0; 4=3). When F2 = 20, the
value of xE1 declines from 1=2 to approximately 1=10 as c increases. In this case, rm 1
never locates at point 0. When F2 = 13, x
E
1 moves from 1=2 to 0 as c increases. Figure 1
demonstrates the following concept. If the interior solution exists in the equilibrium, xE1
is decreasing in c. As F2 increases, x
E
1 is more likely to take a higher value for a given c.
Third, we show the eects of both c and F2 on the equilibrium location of the leader.
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the equilibrium location of rm 1 for dierent values of c and
F2 when r = 0:1, u = 4 and  = 0:098 for Table 4 and  = 0:097 for Table 5. For these
values of r and u, these values of  allow interior solutions of x1. Thus, for  very close
to r, at approximately 0:099, we primarily have x1 = 0; however, for most values of , we
tend to have the other corner solution at x1 = 1=2.
By examining the interior solutions, we can better understand the eects of c and F2.
Values of c increase by 0:1 up to 1.3, as u > 3c, c 2 (0; 4=3). F2 is increased from 10
to 200 in increments of 10. Both tables show two trends. As c increases, if an interior
solution exists in the equilibrium, xE1 decreases. As F2 increases, x
E
1 increases if the
interior solution exists in the equilibrium. As noted in the previous section, the eects of
these two parameters tend to counter each other.
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Figure 1: Plotted values of optimal location for rm 1 with respect to c 2 (9=10; 4=3)
when F2 = 20 (dotted) and F2 = 13 (solid).
4.2 On the importance of endogenous timing by the follower
One of the main points of this paper in contrast to previous papers, including Lambertini
(2002), is that the follower's entry timing is endogenised and the leader determines its
location considering this move. To determine its importance, we examine the relative
sizes of the three terms in equation (21). Equation (21) is the rst-order derivative of
V1 with respect to x1. The rst term represents how the marginal change in the leader's
location delays the follower's entry, allowing the leader to prolong its monopoly regime.
Using the parameters and the leader's location x1 in Table 2, we derive concrete values
of equation (21) in four cases. The common parameter values are r = 0:1; u = 4, c = 1
and F2 = 50. The result is summarised in Table 6.
The sum column in Table 6 indicates how rm 1 decides its location. If the value in
the column is negative (positive), then rm 1 locates at 0 (0.5). If it is 0, an interior
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F2=c 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 1:0 1:1 1:2 1:3
200 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:418 0:353 0:304 0:265
190 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:414 0:348 0:299 0:260
180 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:408 0:343 0:294 0:255
170 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:403 0:338 0:288 0:249
160 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:397 0:332 0:283 0:243
150 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:497 0:391 0:323 0:276 0:236
140 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:489 0:384 0:319 0:269 0:229
130 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:480 0:377 0:312 0:262 0:222
120 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:470 0:369 0:303 0:254 0:213
110 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:460 0:360 0:295 0:245 0:204
100 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:448 0:350 0:285 0:234 0:193
90 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:436 0:339 0:273 0:223 0:181
80 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:422 0:326 0:261 0:210 0:167
70 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:406 0:311 0:246 0:194 0:151
60 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:387 0:294 0:228 0:175 0:132
50 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:365 0:272 0:205 0:152 0:107
40 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:334 0:244 0:176 0:122 0:075
30 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:467 0:298 0:206 0:136 0:079 0:030
20 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:400 0:240 0:15 0:072 0:011 0
10 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:266 0:123 0:191 0 0 0
Table 4: Location of rm 1, xE1 , depending on the values of F2 and c, when r = 0:1;  =
0:097; u = 4.
location between 0 and 0.5 may arise.
The last three cases are interesting. If the rst term is not present, the sum will be
negative, and rm 1 has an incentive to move closer to 0. Therefore, compared with
Lambertini (2002), rm 1 is more likely to locate closer to the centre, forcing rm 2 to
delay its entry. This eect of delaying entry does not exist in Lambertini (2002).
4.3 On total values of the rms
Finally, from the rms' point of view, their total values are more or at least as important
as their entry timing and locations. We examine how the parameters u and c, commonly
used in the Hotelling settings, aect rm values. The result for u is straightforward, but
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F2=c 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 1:0 1:1 1:2 1:3
200 0:5 0:5 0:420 0:305 0:235 0:184 0:144 0:112 0:084 0:061
190 0:5 0:5 0:417 0:302 0:231 0:180 0:140 0:108 0:080 0:057
180 0:5 0:5 0:413 0:298 0:228 0:177 0:136 0:104 0:076 0:053
170 0:5 0:5 0:409 0:294 0:224 0:173 0:132 0:099 0:072 0:048
160 0:5 0:5 0:404 0:290 0:220 0:168 0:128 0:095 0:067 0:043
150 0:5 0:5 0:400 0:286 0:215 0:164 0:123 0:090 0:062 0:038
140 0:5 0:5 0:395 0:281 0:210 0:159 0:118 0:085 0:056 0:032
130 0:5 0:5 0:389 0:276 0:205 0:153 0:112 0:079 0:050 0:026
120 0:5 0:5 0:383 0:271 0:200 0:147 0:106 0:072 0:044 0:019
110 0:5 0:5 0:377 0:265 0:193 0:141 0:099 0:065 0:037 0:012
100 0:5 0:5 0:370 0:258 0:186 0:133 0:092 0:058 0:029 0:004
90 0:5 0:5 0:362 0:250 0:178 0:125 0:083 0:049 0:019 0
80 0:5 0:5 0:353 0:242 0:170 0:116 0:074 0:039 0:009 0
70 0:5 0:5 0:341 0:232 0:159 0:105 0:062 0:027 0 0
60 0:5 0:5 0:331 0:220 0:147 0:092 0:049 0:013 0 0
50 0:5 0:5 0:317 0:206 0:132 0:077 0:033 0 0 0
40 0:5 0:5 0:299 0:188 0:113 0:057 0:012 0 0 0
30 0:5 0:5 0:275 0:163 0:087 0:030 0 0 0 0
20 0:5 0:5 0:239 0:127 0:048 0 0 0 0 0
10 0:5 0:399 0:173 0:056 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5: Location of rm 1, xE1 , depending on the values of F2 and c when r = 0:1;  =
0:098; u = 4.
xE1 First term Second term Third term Sum
 = 0.0985 0 40.844 45.943  107:283  20:496
 = 0.0973 0.192 53.826 42.398  96:224 0
 = 0.0965 0.453 80.420 34.584  115:004 0
 = 0.092 0.5 77.479 31.673  45:367 63.785
Table 6: Values of the three terms in equation (21) when r = 0:1; u = 4; F2 = 50; and
c = 1.
that for c is more complicated.
An increase in u improves the leader's value and possibly worsens the follower's value.
u only appears in the monopoly prot phase of the leader. As it increases, rm 1 has
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more incentive to move closer to the centre, giving rm 2 an incentive to delay its entry
if the leader has not already located at the centre. Because there is only one eect to be
considered, the result is simple.
Examining the impact of the change in c on the values of the leader and follower
requires greater care. We set the parameters as r = 0:1 and u = 4. Figure 2 demonstrates
that the value of the follower is monotonically increasing in c whereas that of the leader
does not move monotonically. In a Hotelling setting, transport cost c can be interpreted
as the degree of product dierentiation. A larger c indicates a greater degree of product
dierentiation.
In our model, if c increases, the follower always enjoys a positive eect on its total
prot, which is not always true for the leader because the eects of an increase in c
are classied into three categories: (i) a decrease in T2, (ii) a decrease in 
M
1 and (iii)
an increase in D1 . In other words, as product space becomes more dierentiated, (i) the
follower enters earlier, (ii) the monopoly prot decreases and (iii) the duopoly prots after
entry increase. The follower only faces (i) and (iii), which are both positive eects for
the follower, yielding that V2 is increasing in c. However, eects (i) and (ii) are negative
for the leader, whereas eect (iii) is positive. As c increases, (ii) and (iii), presented
by M1 and 
D
1 respectively, are linearly changed whereas (i), presented by ~T2, decreases
proportionally to   log c. Thus, when c is close to zero, the eect (i) dominates (iii), and
V1 is decreasing in c. When c is relatively large, eect (i) is small, eect (iii) dominates
(i) and (ii) and V1 is increasing in c.
In the usual static Hotelling game, only eect (iii) exists, yielding that greater dieren-
tiation on a product space always enlarges the values of duopoly rms. This result is well
known in the related literature. However, in our dynamic Hotelling game, greater dier-
entiation in a product space may not benet both rms, thus indicating the importance
of introducing timing into the consideration.
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Figure 2: Plotted values of the values of the leader and the follower with respect to
c 2 f0:001; 0:1; 0:2; 0:3;    ; 1:3g, when r = 0:1, u = 4. V H1 and V H2 are the values of V1
and V2 when  = 0:098 and F1 = F2 = 60. V
L
1 and V
L
2 are the values of V1 and V2 when
 = 0:097 and F1 = F2 = 20.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we develop a duopoly model that determines the follower's entry timing,
rms' locations and their prices. Examining the timing of investments is important when
considering rms' entry strategies. Hence, we extend Lambertini (2002), which in turn
extends the location-price competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) by using a con-
tinuous time model in which rms earn prots in each instance and the follower's entry
timing is given exogenously. Our model endogenises the follower's entry timing. In doing
so, we introduce parameters such as investment costs and a market growth rate to make
the model and the outcome more realistic.
We nd that these changes create a strategic interaction between the leader's location
and the follower's entry timing. As a result, the leader has greater incentive to locate
closer to the centre to delay the follower's entry. We also nd that the follower always
locates as far away as possible from the leader, which is a robust result also seen in Lam-
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bertini (2002). Numerical analyses are also presented that investigate how the exogenous
parameters aect the leader's location and the rms' values. In particular, the prot of
the leader changes non-monotonically with an increase in the transport cost parameter.
A potential future study should address the last result, for which the relationship
between the rm values and the transport cost parameter c is nontrivial. c can be inter-
preted as a parameter that describes the degree of product dierentiation. Therefore, c
is important for rms and their marketing strategies, necessitating its careful estimation.
Another issue that needs to be addressed is making the entry timing fully endogenous. In
this paper, we allow the follower to enter endogenously; however, the game starts when
the leader enters at T = 0, thus exogenously. This setting is intentional in order to com-
pare our result to Lambertini (2002). However, we may allow the leader to endogenously
enter and, more interestingly, allow a preemption by the rms to enable full analysis of
the endogenous entry timing model, as indicated by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
The duopoly result is a straightforward maximisation of prot by the two rms, as
previously stated. See, for example, d'Aspremont et al., (1979).
As for a monopoly, rm 1 is located at or to the left of 1/2, which we denote as x1.
Firm 1 sets up its price so that the consumer at 1 or at a point to the left of 1 is indierent
between purchasing and not purchasing. That is, the consumer at 1 has no surplus, as
otherwise rm 1 has an incentive to increase its price without losing any of its consumers.
Let this indierent consumer be denoted x^.
Firm 1's prot is given by
1 = p1x^;
s:t: u  p1   c(x^  x1)2 = 0:
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Substituting p1 of the constraint into the prot and maximising with respect to x^ gives
@1

p1
@x^
= u  c(3x^  x1)(x^  x1) > 0;
from Assumption 1. Thus, the rm sets x^ to be at 1 and we have the monopoly result.
Finally, we must show that the monopoly and duopoly results are sensitive to time
only with respect to the entry timing. We show in three steps that this point holds.
First, after the follower enters the market (at a given T2), the corresponding prots
are independent of time t. That is, rm 1 maximises the following with respect to p1t:
max
p1t
Z x
0
p1t(x;x1; x2; p2t)dx
and rm 2 maximises the following with respect to p2t:
max
p2t
Z 1
x
p2t(x;x1; x2; p1t)dx:
The result is the aforementioned simple duopoly.
Second, given this result, rm 2 determines T2. Firm 2 maximises equation (3) with
respect to T2, and notably, this process does not depend on how rm 1 sets its prices
before rm 2 enters the market.
Third, because rm 1's price before rm 2's entry, p1t; t 2 [0; T2), does not aect post-
entry competition (the rst step) or entry timing (the second step), rm 1 maximises the
following with respect to p1t:
max
p1t
Z 1
0
p1t(x; x1)dx:
Therefore, the prot maximisation problem corresponds to the maximisation of the inte-
grand. Therefore, rm 1 achieves the monopoly instantaneous prot ow as previously
given.
Hence, we show that the maximisation of the instantaneous prot ows is equivalent
to the maximisation of total prots.
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